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CASES NOTED
EMINENT DOMAIN-COMPENSATION FOR LAND
SUBJECTED TO THE THREAT
OF CONDEMNATION
In 1957 the State Road Department publicly announced that the
route of a new interstate highway would pass through Orlando, Florida.
The following year, the Department commenced several condemnation
suits in order to acquire the right of way for the highway. The suit to
acquire the parcels here involved, however, was not instituted until May,
1960. During the interim the market value of the land declined as a
result of the anticipated condemnation. The jury rendered a verdict on
the basis of the property's depressed value. Upon the property owners'
contention that error had been committed in admitting testimony con-
cerning the property's depreciated value, a new trial was granted which
was affirmed by the district court of appeal.' On certiorari2 to the
supreme court, held, affirmed: when the value of the property has de-
preciated in light of an anticipated taking, the condemnation is to be
calculated by disregarding the effect of the anticipation. State Rd. Dep't
v. Chicone, 158 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1963).
The Florida Constitution' provides that a property owner be ade-
quately and fairly compensated for property which is taken from him
for public use. Generally, the valuation which is established, whenever
possible, will be the property's fair market value.' In computing the fair
market value, and in an effort to reach the desirable objective of a fair
and equitable result,' at least four points in time have been utilized for
the purpose of estimating the property's value: (1) at the time of the
actual taking;' (2) at the time when there has been a change in value; 7
1. State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone, 148 So.2d 532 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), wherein the court
challenged the validity of the rule set forth in Sunday v. Louisville & N.R.R., 62 Fla. 395,
57 So. 351 (1912) as applied to eminent domain cases generally, and specifically, refused
its application in the Chicone case.
2. FLA. R. App. P. 4.5. See also note 19 infra.
3. FLA. CONST. art. 16, § 29. See 12 FLA. JUR. Eminent Domain § 67 (1957):
Property cannot be taken for public use without adequate compensation. The
constitution specifically forbids the taking of property for public use without just
compensation. A taking without justification is also a violation of both the state
and federal constitutional provisions prohibiting the taking of a person's property
without due process of law.
4. 4 NicHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.2 (3d ed. 1962); Boyer & Wilcox, An Economic
Appraisal of Leasehold Valuation in Condemnation Proceedings, 17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 245,
249 (1963).
5. 18 Am. JUR. Eminent Domain § 240 (1938).
6. Southern Elec. Generating Co. v. Leibacher, 269 Ala. 9, 110 So.2d 308 (1959);
Gabriel v. Cox, 130 Conn. 165, 32 A.2d 649 (1943); Crist v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n,
123 N.W.2d 424 (Iowa 1963); Collinwood v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 181 Kan. 43,
310 P.2d 211 (1957); In re Mackie's Petition, 362 Mich. 697, 108 N.W.2d 755 (1961);
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(3) at the beginning of the condemnation proceedings; 8 and (4) at the
time of the service of summons.9
When property has appreciated in value as a result of the antici-
pated condemnation, the above four rules are generally to the advantage
of the property owner; 10 per contra, if there has been a depreciation in
value, an inequitable result would obtain."
Some jurisdictions have specifically provided for an exception to
the previously mentioned four rules generally considered in the event of
Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Stout, 242 Miss. 208, 134 So.2d 467 (1961); Berry
v. State, 103 N.H. 147, 167 A.2d 437 (1961) ; State v. Jones, 27 N.J. 257, 142 A.2d 232
(1958); Tulsa County Drainage Dist. Number 12 v. Wright, 165 P.2d 639 (Okla. 1946);
State Highway Comm'n v. Anderson, 381 P.2d 707 (Ore. 1963); Frontage, Inc. v. County
of Allegheny, 400 Pa. 249, 162 A.2d 1 (1960) ; L'Etoile v. Director of Pub. Works, 89 R.I.
394, 153 A.2d 173 (1959); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Miller, 273 S.C. 286,
117 S.E.2d 561 (1960); City of Huron v. Jelgerhuis, 77 S.D. 600, 97 N.W.2d 314 (1959);
State v. Rascoe, 181 Tenn. 43, 178 S.W.2d 392 (1944); State v. Lasiter, 352 S.W.2d 915
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961); State v. Smith, 171 P.2d 853 (Wash. 1946); State v. City of
Dunbar, 142 W.Va. 332, 95 S.E.2d 457 (1956); Grant v. Cronin, 12 Wis. 2d 352, 107
N.W.2d 153 (1961).
7. City & County of Denver v. Smith, 381 P.2d 269 (Colo. 1963); City of Ashland
v. Queen, 254 Ky. 329, 71 S.W.2d 650 (1934) ; State v. Hayward, 243 La. 1036, 150 So.2d 6
(1963); Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 661, 157 N.E.2d 209 (1959) ; In re Thrags
Neck Expressway, 16 App. Div. 2d 570, 229 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1962); Town of Ayden v.
Lancaster, 197 N.C. 556, 150 S.E. 40 (1929). In all of the above cited cases the change
in value had been an appreciation as a result of the anticipated condemnation and the
courts refused to let the condemnee profit.
8. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1942); United States v. McCrory Holding
Co., 294 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1961); Missouri & N. Ark. R. Co. v. Chapman, 150 Ark. 334,
234 S.W. 171 (1921) ; Department of Pub. Works & Bldg. v. Divit, 251 11. 2d 93, 182
N.E.2d 749 (1962); State v. Pahl, 257 Minn. 177, 100 N.W.2d 724 (1960); Union Elec.
Co. v. Stahlschmidt, 365 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1963); In re Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irri-
gation Dist., 159 Neb. 609, 68 N.W.2d 200 (1955); White v. State Highway Comm'n, 201
Va. 885, 114 S.E.2d 614 (1960).
9. Dong v. State, 90 Ariz. 148, 367 P.2d 202 (1961); Oregon-Washington R.R. & Nay.
Co. v. Campbell, 34 Idaho 601, 202 Pac. 1065 (1921); Weber Basin Water Conservancy
Dist. v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959).
10. Florida is among those states allowing the condemnee to recover the value of his
land as appreciated by the anticipated condemnation. See Sunday v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
62 Fla. 395, 57 So. 351 (1912).
11. The inequities to the condemnee in the depreciation situation are discussed in 4
NIcHor.s, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.3151[2] (3d ed. 1962):
To allow a public agency to depress market values in a particular neighborhood
by threatening to erect an offensive structure in its midst, and then to take ad-
vantage of this depression in paying for the land required for the structure would
be so abhorrent to the public sense of justice that it has never been seriously
argued that it could be done. (Emphasis added.)
Yet, at least three states have been confronted with the argument that the depreciation
in value is of no concern to the condemnor. State v. Hollis, 93 Ariz. 200, 379 P.2d 750
(1963); Congressional School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. State Rd. Comm'n, 218 Md. 236, 146
A.2d 518 (1928); City of Cleveland v. Cardone, 190 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio App. 1963). All
three decisions were in line with the Chicone case. Further, the Arizona and Ohio cases
were also cases of first impression.
Those states which provide for assessment "at the time of the actual taking," by a
liberal interpretation could, and probably would, reach the same result. They need only
interpret the time of taking to be that time when it becomes known that there will be
a condemnation.
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a depreciation in value. 2 In order to protect the taxpayers' monies, as
well as the condemnee's interests, at least two states have provided that
valuation should be made at a point just prior to any fluctuation in value
which may occur as a result of the anticipated governmental acquisition.1"
In Florida, however, the general rule since at least 1912"s has been:
"[T]he amount of compensation to be awarded to a property owner
when his property is sought to be taken in an eminent domain proceed-
ings is the value of the land taken at the time of the lawful appropria-
tion."15 The "time of the lawful appropriation" has been determined
to be at the time of the filing of the condemnation suit in the proper
court.' o6 Consequently, if the property appreciated in value as a result
of the anticipated appropriation, the owner would be enriched to that
extent.'T
State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone'8 presented a novel situation for the
Florida Supreme Court; the property depreciated in value as a direct
result of the prospective condemnation. The court, in an effort to reach
an equitable result, and because of the obvious factual uniqueness in-
volved,' 9 declined to apply the general rule and adopted instead, the
rule adhered to in Maryland." The Maryland rule is that compensation
should be awarded on the basis of what the value would 'be if the lands
were not to be taken and the public improvement were not to be made."
Therefore, as a result of the Chicone case, Florida now has two rules
for valuation in eminent domain proceedings: (1) when the value of the
property has remained unchanged or appreciated as a result of the
anticipated condemnation, value is assessed at the time of the lawful
appropriation; 22 and (2) when the value has depreciated in light of an
anticipated taking, value is calculated by disregarding the effect of the
anticipation.
12. State v. Hollis, note 11 supra; Congressional School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. State
Rd. Comm'n, note 11 supra; City of Cleveland v. Carcione, note 11 supra and accompany-
ing text.
13. Congressional School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. State Rd. Comm'n, 218 Md. 236, 146
A.2d 558 (1958) ; City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 190 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio App. 1963).
14. Sunday v. Louisville & N.R.R., 62 Fla. 395, 57 So. 351 (1912).
15. Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1955), citing to Sunday v.
Louisville & N.R.R., note 14 supra.
16. Sunday v. Louisville & N.R.R., note 14 supra; Yoder v. Sarasota County, note 15
supra; Anhoco Corp. v. Dade County, 127 So.2d 464 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
17. Sunday v. Louisville & N.R.R., note 14 supra; Yoder v. Sarasota County, note 15
supra; State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone, 158 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1963) (dicta).
18. 158 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1963).
19. The court pointed out that the Sunday and Yoder cases involved appreciation,
whereas Chicone involved depreciation. The conflict jurisdiction which supported the issu-
ance of a writ of certiorari was based on the fact that the former cases ruled that value
was to be estimated at the time of taking (filing of the suit) and the instant one ruled
that value was to be estimated at some time prior to the "taking."
20. Congressional School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. State Rd. Comm'n, 218 Md. 236, 146
A.2d 558 (1958).
21. Id. at 250, 146 A.2d at 565.
22. See cases cited in note 17 supra.
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No writer could reasonably challenge the soundness of the court's
position in the instant case. When an arm of the government seeks to
take a man's property, every protection should be afforded the citizen
so that he is fairly compensated. Chicone provides just that protection
through a rule which assures that equity will be done. The law of Florida
now fully protects all property owners who are confronted with eminent
domain proceedings. To achieve. a position closer to perfection in this
area, only one step remains-the adoption of the corollary to the Chicone
rule; that is, complete adoption of the Maryland rule so that the owner
neither loses in the event of depreciation nor gains in the event of appre-
ciation. This type of transition would not only protect the condemnee,
but would also ensure that public funds would be fairly and prudently
disbursed.
NATHANIEL E. GOZANSKY
PROBATE-DISCOVERY AVAILABLE IN WILL CONTESTS
The daughter of the testator renounced the ten dollars awarded her
under the will in probate, and filed a petition for revocation of probate of
the will, alleging the lack of mental capacity of the testator and undue
influence. Prior to the trial the petitioner attempted to use certain
discovery devices by serving the respondent-executors with requests for
admissions, interrogatories, a notice for taking depositions, and a motion
for production of documents. The objections of the respondent-executors
were sustained and discovery was denied on the ground that the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure were inapplicable to a proceeding of this nature.
By certiorari review of the interlocutory order, held, order quashed: a
will contest is both a civil action and a special proceeding in the county
judge's court, and when filed within a probate proceeding, the parties
are entitled to the use of discovery devices provided for in the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure. Estes v. Estes, 158 So.2d 794 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963).
A "will contest" is a legal proceeding brought for the purpose of
determining whether or not a will is valid.' At the time that the right to
devise realty by will was first conferred, it was not possible to contest a
testamentary disposition2 since there were no proceedings available to
probate a will devising real property.' On the death of the testator the
devisee under the will took possession of the land. Anyone who desired
1. E.g., McCrary v. Michael, 109 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. App. 1937); Smith v. Negley,
304 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
2. Campbell v. Porter, 162 U.S. 478 (1896); In re Dana, 138 Fla. 676, 190 So. 52
(1938); In re Duffy, 228 Iowa 426, 292 N.W. 165 (1940); In re Noble, 338 Pa. 490,
13 A.2d 422 (1940).
3. In re Duffy, supra note 2.
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